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1 Introduction
Multinational firms have been playing a crucial role for economic integration: acquisitions of
existing foreign assets in host countries have surpassed investments in new assets (greenfield
investment), and multinational sales through foreign affiliates have outnumbered exports since
the 1980s. According to the traditional models of foreign direct investment (FDI) (such as the
knowledge capital model by Markusen, 1984; Horstmann and Markusen, 1992; Markusen and
Venables, 1998; and the proximity-concentration trade off and the tariff-jumping hypothesis
articulated by Brainard, 1993; 1997), undertaking FDI forgoes economies of scale at the plant
level (as firms incur plant-level fixed FDI costs to locate their production and services close to
consumers). That said, by undertaking FDI, firms can well benefit from firm-level economies
of scale (generated by their intangible assets) and can avoid trade-related costs. In general, the
literature has shown that horizontal FDI (that duplicates the production process in a foreign
country) is encouraged by large market size, high trade and transport costs and low plant-level
fixed investment costs (e.g., see Navaretti and Venables, 2004). That is, there is a threshold fixed
investment cost (the level of which is determined by market size, trade costs, and firms’ marginal
costs) below which horizontal FDI is more profitable than trade (e.g., see Antrás and Yeaple
2014).1 This, however, leads to the conclusion that, as most countries liberalized trade and foreign
investments around the same time, and as trade costs have been gradually decreased (and they
have been significantly low), the probability of horizontal FDI should substantially decrease. This
conclusion, however, does not consider cross-border mergers and acquisitions, which are in most
cases subject to certain enforcement practices and/or foreign market entry regulations.
This study thus (i) models cross-border firm acquisitions as an alternative foreign market entry
mode; (ii) focuses on a specific foreign market entry regulation, in which a consumer-welfare
argument is strategically used;2 and (iii) allows for competitive bidding for foreign acquisition.
In particular, the model focuses on multinational competition for potential cross-border firm
acquisition, for which there is a minimum output requirement imposed by the host country as part
of its foreign market entry regulation. In a simple oligopolistic market entry model, this study
shows that cross-border firm acquisitions may emerge as the equilibrium foreign market entry
mode even when they will have earned multinationals less profits compared to trade in the times
of complete trade liberalization abolishing trade costs, and/or compared to greenfield investment
1 In particular, low trade costs warrant even a lower fixed investment cost threshold below which FDI will be more
profitable than trade. Alternatively, in a trade model with monopolistic competition and firm heterogeneity, Helpman
et al. (2004) show that there is sorting by productivity thresholds determining firms’ foreign market entry modes. By
the same token, in a simple linear Cournot model with constant marginal production costs and firm heterogeneity, it
is straightforward to show that (e.g., see Koska et al. 2018a), unless there is prohibitively large fixed investment cost,
denoted F , (so FDI is not profitable for any firm), or unless there is negligibly small F (so FDI is more profitable than
trade for all firms), for any F , there is a corresponding threshold cost type, denoted λ (F), such that firms with marginal
cost c∗ < λ (F) will prefer FDI over trade, and those with c∗ > λ (F) will prefer trade over FDI.
2 A consumer welfare argument that can be considered the common practice in most countries as documented by
Breinlich et al. (2017) challenges mergers and acquisitions on the basis whether they lessen competition and adversely
affect consumers.
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when fixed costs are small, and when there is no significant fixed cost saving among different entry
modes.3
Recent FDI models take into account cross-border mergers and acquisitions and study optimal
foreign market entry modes (e.g., see Görg, 2000; Das and Sengupta, 2001; Bjorvatn, 2004;
Norbäck and Persson, 2004; Müller, 2007; Fatica, 2010; Koska 2015) and their welfare implications
and optimal government policies (e.g., Barros and Cabral, 1994; Head and Ries, 1997; Horn and
Levinsohn, 2001; Mattoo et al., 2004; Saggi and Yildiz, 2006; Norbäck and Persson, 2007). This
literature shows that the optimal foreign market entry mode is determined mainly according to the
trade-off between trade costs, fixed investment costs, and firm acquisition costs.4 As for welfare
implications, it is well established that greenfield entry may reduce welfare, especially if foreign
entrants are not sufficiently productive. Similarly, cross-border mergers and acquisitions can be
optimal for a foreign firm, although they can be anticompetitive and decrease welfare by increasing
market concentration, especially if efficiency gains are not sufficient.5 Most studies in this literature
focus on a single foreign firm’s market entry, and thus they abstract from important implications of
strategic bidding competition among multinationals for foreign acquisitions. Given the extent of
multinational activities around the globe, however, competition among multinationals is inevitable.
As for the studies looking at the welfare implications of a foreign firm’s market entry and the
optimal government policy, they focus only on foreign ownership restrictions (e.g., see Norbäck
and Persson, 2007; or Bose et al., 2011), or on competition policies by antitrust authorities (e.g.,
see Horn and Levinsohn, 2001; or Kejzar, 2011). While Bose et al. (2011) show that it is optimal
to impose ceilings on foreign ownership of domestic firms (especially if the government’s objective
is to maximize domestic shareholders’ gains), Norbäck and Persson (2007) find that it is optimal
to allow not only for greenfield entry, but also for cross-border mergers and acquisitions at the
same time. This latter finding is consistent with the empirical evidence that most countries have
removed restrictions on foreign ownership and do not make a distinction between greenfield entry
and foreign acquisitions; see UNCTAD (2000), for details. The literature is, however, silent on
whether host countries that liberalize trade and remove restrictions on foreign ownership can avoid
3 Helpman et al. (2004) document that some firms may prefer FDI over exporting also in situations where trade is
liberalized, so long as there are sufficient transport costs. Alternatively, Koska et al. (2018a) show that if there is ex ante
incomplete cost information, and if FDI can serve as a signal of high productivity, then greenfield FDI can be optimal
even when trade and transport costs are zero. Similarly, Koska (2019) finds that also FDI through acquisition of a local
firm can be the optimal entry mode in the times of complete trade liberalization.
4 In particular, it can be argued that foreign acquisitions can be more profitable than greenfield entry, especially when
the cost of shared ownership is relatively low, and/or when foreign acquisitions generate significant synergies (reducing
production costs) among firms (e.g., see Raff et al., 2006; 2009; 2012).
5 The Industrial Organization (IO) literature on mergers and acquisitions shows that a merger is profitable only if it
includes at least 80 per cent of the total number of firms in the market so that there is no substantial business stealing
by the firms that do not participate in the merger, which is referred to as the merger paradox (see Salant et al., 1983).
The literature shows that such a merger paradox can be avoided especially when a merger leads to sufficient efficiency
gains as in Perry and Porter (1985); when there is convex demand as in Hennessy (2000); when products are sufficiently
differentiated as in Lommerud and Sorgard (1997); and/or when firms compete in a market of strategic complements as
in Deneckere and Davidson (1985).
www.economics-ejournal.org 3
Economics: The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal 13 (2019-20)
detrimental welfare effects of FDI, especially through a foreign market entry regulation favoring
consumer welfare.
The IO literature has already scrutinized, to some extent, the implications of a consumer-welfare
argument employed as a competition policy practice. That is, the IO literature focuses on mergers
between firms that are already competing in the same market and on the application of a consumer-
surplus standard in approvals of domestic mergers; see, for example, Dertwinkel-Kalt and Wey
(2016); Nocke and Whinston (2010); and Goppelsroeder et al. (2008). In the case of domestic
acquisitions, any transfer of surplus among firms still contributes to total welfare. With foreign
market entry, however, some surplus is transferred from local agents to multinationals (which
may not retain their profits in the host country). Foreign acquisition will increase consumer
welfare (relative to the case when there is no foreign market entry), while transferring local
profits abroad. That is, an antitrust authority would approve such foreign acquisitions based on
consumer welfare, although such foreign market entry would be welfare decreasing (especially
had there been no sufficient efficiency gains). Alternatively, as the current study would like to
demonstrate, the host country can incorporate a consumer welfare argument into its foreign market
entry regulation, and can better address the detrimental welfare effects of FDI. The important
implications of incorporating a consumer welfare argument into foreign market entry regulations
have been overlooked, especially in the context of potential cross-border firm acquisitions by the
trade and FDI literature. The exception is Koska (2019) that takes on board a minimum output
requirement (based on a consumer-welfare argument) imposed by the host country as part of its
foreign market entry regulation. In Koska (2019), there is seller competition (local firms compete
to sell their business to a foreign firm), although there is only one foreign firm entering the host
country. In contrast, this paper focuses on buyer competition (foreign firms compete to acquire
a local firm). Norbäck and Persson (2008) take both types of competition on board (and they
consider an oligopolistic market structure) and study different types of firm buyouts (domestic
vs foreign and hostile vs preemptive takeover), although they do not consider any foreign market
entry regulation, nor do they look at welfare implications. This study, thus, extends discussions of
both Koska (2019) and Norbäck and Persson (2008).
The model focuses on two potential foreign entrants (with their headquarters outside the host
country) competing for foreign acquisition of a local firm and scrutinizes the implications of
imposing a minimum output requirement for cross-border firm acquisitions on foreign market entry
behavior and welfare. The idea follows the observation that (i) multinationals do negotiate with
host countries before their foreign market entry; and that (ii) certain production requirements can
be imposed by host countries on foreign market entry. Moreover, anecdotal evidence shows that
host countries might try to exploit competition among multinationals to help local firms earn higher
rents for their scarce and valuable domestic assets.6 In general, detrimental effects of mergers
and acquisitions on consumers are minimized when the merged firms (or the new entity) behave
6 See, for example, the role Chinese government officials played in the bidding competition between SABMiller
(British brewer) and Anheuser-Busch (American brewer) for Harbin Brewery (Chinese brewer) as discussed in Norbäck
and Persson (2008).
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more aggressively in terms of production. Although host countries that liberalize trade and remove
restrictions on foreign ownership lose some important policy tools, this study shows that they can
still strategically regulate their markets further for foreign market entry so as to increase local
welfare. The idea is to strategically use a consumer welfare argument and impose a minimum
output requirement for foreign acquisitions.
In a linear Cournot model with constant marginal production costs, introducing a minimum output
requirement for foreign acquisitions implies that only those with sufficient efficiency gains will
be incentive compatible for foreign acquiring firms. As is demonstrated in this study, when the
minimum output requirement is determined in a way that consumers will have gained (should
there be a foreign firm acquisition), also the acquired local firm will have gained by receiving a
higher acquisition price (especially through the bidding competition between the foreign firms).
In particular, this study shows that in a non-cooperative equilibrium, a host country can lead a
foreign firm to acquire the local firm for purely preemptive reasons (so long as there is competition
for the local firm’s assets).7 Consequently, a host country can substantially gain in terms of local
welfare, and can even trap multinationals in a "prisoner’s dilemma" situation, especially when
there is fierce competition for foreign acquisition. Although multinationals could have gained
more had they been able to credibly commit to independent foreign sales (either via greenfield FDI
or trade) following complete liberalization, they will have a strong incentive to deviate from such
mutually beneficial "cooperative" equilibrium, and thus will end up bidding up the acquisition
price to the extent that they will earn less in a non-cooperative equilibrium.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3 details the
minimum output requirement warranted by the strategic use of a consumer welfare argument in
regulating foreign market entry, and solves the model for the equilibrium market entry modes. In
particular, this section shows that when there is multinational competition for potential foreign
acquisition, the strategic use of a consumer welfare argument in regulating foreign market entry
leads the multinationals to compete for potential foreign acquisition for purely preemptive reasons.
Section 4 scrutinizes the welfare implications of the model. This section demonstrates that
when there is multinational competition for potential cross-border firm acquisition, any foreign
acquisition that fulfills the minimum output requirement leads to higher local welfare as compared
to the case multinationals enter the host country by independent foreign sales (or compared to the
initial case without foreign market entry). Finally, Section 5 concludes the study.
2 The model
The model considers a host country market initially served by a monopoly local firm, denoted firm
l. Following the stylized facts on multinationals such that their intangible assets enable them to
7 As will be clear in Section 3, efficiency gains are the key in such a preemptive motive for foreign acquisitions. Also
Molnar (2007) shows that such preemptive firm acquisitions are empirically supported by US data.
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penetrate oligopolistic markets, the model assumes that entry to this market is restricted: that is,
similar to Koska (2019) and Koska et al. (2018a), firms that are willing to produce for this market
need Z units of a specific factor to develop intangible assets within firm boundaries so as to be
able to produce at all. The aggregate supply of this factor is strictly less than 4Z and the outside
option of this factor determines its wage, which is normalized to unity. Therefore, the model
focuses on a single local firm (already invested in specific factor Z) and two potential entrants
with their headquarters outside the host country (to avoid dissipation of their knowledge capital),
namely multinational firms 1 and 2.8 Note that investment in specific factor Z only makes the firms
productive for the host country market, and thus fixed cost Z plays no role in determining foreign
market entry modes. All firms are risk neutral and produce a homogeneous good. Following the
common observation in most countries, the model assumes that the multinationals have a cost
advantage over the local firm.9 The multinational firms are identical in their ex-ante (constant)
marginal cost of production (especially when they both export, or undertake greenfield investment,
under complete liberalization), denoted c1 = c2 = c∗, while the local monopoly firm’s constant
marginal cost of production is cl = c > c∗, where c ∈ (0,1).
Alternatively, one of the multinationals can acquire existing assets of the local firm. It should be
noted that although the two multinationals are ex ante identical in their production costs, foreign
acquisition leads them to differ in their ex-post productivity. The idea is that efficiency gains
generated by foreign acquisition of the local firm are different among multinationals, especially
when different foreign assets are combined with local assets. In particular, foreign acquisition
enables the acquiring multinational and the acquired local firm to combine their assets, and thus to
decrease marginal production costs. Let θk ∈ [0,θ ], k ∈ {1,2}, denote the ex-post marginal cost of
the multinational after having acquired existing assets of firm l. As in Koska (2019), θ is the upper
bound that is implied by the strategic use of a consumer welfare argument in regulating foreign
market entry, which warrants a minimum output requirement for foreign acquisition, that is, any
foreign takeover that generates sufficient synergies such that θk ≤ θ , k ∈ {1,2} (so that it fulfills
the minimum output requirement) will be allowed by the host country as part of its foreign market
entry regulation; see Condition 1.10
8 The model assumes two foreign firms that have already maintained capacity in different countries, and thus refers to
these firms as multinationals.
9 The model assumes a local firm (without capacity anywhere but the host country) and two foreign firms that
have already maintained capacity in different countries and they owe their superior productivity to their large R&D
investments and intensive use of professional and technical workers generating proprietary knowledge. This merely
follows the stylized facts on multinationals. For instance, Müller (2007: 95) reports that it is the common observation
that local firms in many markets in Central and Eastern Europe generally possess a less efficient production technology
compared to multinational firms entering those markets.
10 It will be clear in Section 3 that θ is determined through commitment to a minimum output level in the case of
foreign acquisition as the outcome of negotiations between the host country and the multinationals. As the focus of
the study is multinational competition for potential foreign acquisition, the cases that θk > θ ,k ∈ {1,2} (those that do
not qualify for the minimum output requirement) are assumed away. Also it should be noted that the specifics of the
model do not allow for domestic firm entry (e.g., some specific foreign intangible assets are required to penetrate a
local monopoly/duopoly market, and local assets only together with more efficient foreign assets generate synergies and
fulfills the minimum output requirement given by Condition 1).
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Consumers’ preferences in the host country can be represented by a quadratic utility function that
leads to the linear inverse demand function given by P(Q) = (1−Q), where P is the market price
of the homogeneous good and Q stands for aggregate output. Total production (or sales) if both
multinationals opt for alternative market entry modes (other than foreign acquisition), referred to as
independent foreign sales, Q f = q fl +∑k q
f
k , comprises the two multinationals’ total outputs ∑k q
f
k ,
k ∈ {1,2}, and the local firm’s output q fl , where superscript f stands for independent foreign sales,
and subscript l represents the local firm.11 If one of the two multinationals enters the host country
by acquiring existing assets of the local firm, then there will be a duopoly market structure, in which
case total sales, Qa = qakl +q
e
−k - if multinational k acquires the local assets - will comprise the
acquiring multinational’s output qakl and the non-acquiring multinational’s output q
e
−k, k ∈ {1,2}.
Note that superscript a represents foreign acquisition of the local firm, and superscript e represents
the non-acquiring multinational competing against foreign acquisition by independent foreign sales.
Consistent with this notation, π fl and π
f
k , k ∈ {1,2}, represent, respectively, the local firm’s and the
multinationals’ profits when the multinationals penetrate the host country market by independent
foreign sales, and πak and π
e
−k represent those when multinational k, k ∈ {1,2}, acquires local
firm l. In the case of foreign acquisition of the local firm, the local firm earns the acquisition price,
denoted Ω, which is determined endogenously. The interaction between firms takes place such
that if foreign market entry is allowed by the host country in the first stage, then following the
negotiations for foreign market entry with the host country, first the multinationals’ foreign market
entry modes are sorted (see Section 3 for details), then given the multinationals’ foreign market
entry modes, following their entry, all active firms in the market compete by quantities. The game
is solved backwards.
In the last stage of the game (once the multinationals’ entry modes are sorted), all active firms
in the market engage in Cournot competition. Given the linear inverse demand function for
a homogeneous good and the firms’ constant marginal costs of production, in a linear Cournot
oligopoly model, all firms make their output decisions simultaneously. The objective is to maximize
profits, given by πi(·) = (p(Q)−ci)qi, where i ∈ {l,1,2}. The maximized firm profits thus can be
expressed as a function of optimal firm outputs: π∗i =−(∂ p(Q)/∂qi)(q∗i )2, where (∂ p(Q)/∂qi) =
−1, and thus, π∗i = (q∗i )2, where i∈ {l,1,2}. Cournot solutions for the optimal quantities produced
by each firm (q∗i ) in each case (i.e., monopoly, independent foreign sales by the two multinationals
(oligopoly), and foreign acquisition of the local firm by one multinational (duopoly)), and the
corresponding maximized profits are given below.
Consider first the case without any foreign market entry by either multinational in the host country
(or the case the host country does not allow for foreign market entry), which is referred to as
the local monopoly case. The local firm will be able to maintain its monopoly power, and will
produce at the output level of qml = (1− c)/2 and will earn monopoly profit πml = (1− c)2/4,
where superscript m represents the monopoly case.
11 Throughout the study, exporting to the host country or undertaking greenfield investment in the host country is
referred to as independent foreign sales.
www.economics-ejournal.org 7
Economics: The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal 13 (2019-20)
Suppose now the market is completely liberalized for trade and foreign ownership, and market
entry by foreign firms is allowed (which should be determined by the host country in the first stage
of the game; see Section 4): in this context, exporting requires no trade costs under complete trade
liberalization, and the differences in fixed costs among alternative entry modes are normalized to
zero such that the multinationals are indifferent between trade and greenfield investment.12 If both
multinationals opt for independent foreign sales, and the three firms compete by quantities, then
the local firm’s output will be q fl = (1−3c+2c∗)/4, and the two multinationals’ outputs will be
q f1 = q
f
2 = (1−2c∗+ c)/4.
















It is clear from eq.(1) that in the case of oligopolistic market structure, a firm produces and earns
more the smaller is its marginal production cost, while it produces and earns less the smaller the
rivals’ costs. Also, comparing eq.(1) with the monopoly outcome, it is straightforward to show
that (i) market entry decreases the average industry marginal cost and increases competition with
which the local firm’s sales and profits decrease; and (ii) an increase in competition decreases the
market price and increases aggregate sales. Note that the model assumes (1−3c+2c∗)> 0 such
that there is no crowding-out effect of market entry by multinationals.
If multinational k ∈ {1,2} acquires the existing assets of local firm l, and the other multinational
competes against foreign acquisition by independent foreign sales, then the acquiring firm’s
output will be qakl = (1−2θk + c∗)/3, and the non-acquiring multinational’s output will be qe−k =














where πakl is multinational k’s gross profits from foreign acquisition, and θk is its ex-post marginal
cost of production. In case of foreign acquisition, acquiring multinational k will have to pay
acquired firm l an acquisition price (Ω), which is determined endogenously; see the next section.
Thus, the net return from foreign acquisition to multinational k is πak = π
a
kl(θk)−Ω, and to the
acquired firm is Ω. Foreign acquisition decreases competition by decreasing the number of firms
by one as compared to the case that both multinationals enter the market by independent foreign
sales. To offset the negative impact of a decrease in the number of firms on aggregate output,
sufficient synergies in foreign acquisition (a sufficiently low ex-post marginal cost of production)
is warranted. The next section shows that a minimum output requirement for foreign acquisition as
part of the foreign market entry regulation not only warrants sufficient synergies but also can be
used strategically to transfer surplus from multinationals to the local firm.
12 In particular, as in Koska (2019), the model can easily accommodate some non-prohibitive fixed investment and
per-unit trade costs without changing the results qualitatively, although the exposition of the model will be more tedious
without any further insight.
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3 Multinational competition for foreign acquisition
Following Koska (2019), the minimum output requirement for foreign acquisition, which is
warranted by the strategic use of a consumer welfare argument in regulating foreign market entry,
is determined as the outcome of negotiations between the host country and the multinationals. Upon
investing in specific factor Z that makes firms productive for the market, the multinationals express
their interest in entering the host country market. The host country then asks the multinationals
to open their books which will reveal the particulars of their performance should they enter the
host country as a solo firm via independent foreign sales. The host country can easily solve their
problem backwards, and can require any multinational to commit to not produce below a certain
output level in the case of entry by foreign acquisition. Using a consumer welfare argument
strategically, the host country can choose the minimum output requirement for foreign acquisition
as one that secures the same aggregate output as in the case both multinationals enter the market
via independent foreign sales.13
The model thus assumes that if foreign market entry is allowed (see Section 4 for discussions
on this), then any foreign acquisition by a multinational will be allowed so long as it fulfills the
minimum output requirement given by Condition 1:
Condition 1 (Consumer-surplus standard) With foreign acquisition, a multinational should
commit to produce at least q̄akl(θ̄ ,c
∗) such that Qa(θ̄ ,c∗) = Q f (c,c∗,c∗), where θ̄ = (3c+2c∗−
1)/4.
As in Koska (2019), given the Cournot setting with constant marginal costs, Condition 1 puts an
upper bound to the ex-post marginal cost of the acquiring multinational such that θk ∈ [0, θ̄ ], k ∈
{1,2}. To focus on multinational competition for foreign acquisition, suppose both multinationals
can generate sufficient synergies by combining their assets with the local assets.
If neither multinational opts for foreign acquisition, then they both enter the market via independent
foreign sales, which is referred to as the cooperative equilibrium. As is already discussed in Section
2, the multinationals differ in their ex-post productivity due to different efficiency gains their
assets generate when combined with the local assets. Therefore, it is possible that only one
multinational attempts to acquire the local firm, while the other multinational decides not to
compete for foreign acquisition. If only multinational k has decided to acquire the local firm
(while the other multinational has decided to enter the market via independent foreign sales), then
multinational k’s "takeover" valuation, denoted vtk, can be written as the difference between its
acquisition profit given by eq.(2) and its profit when it competes against the other two firms by
13 Foreign acquisition generates efficiency gains by enabling the involving parties to combine their productive assets,
and their ex-post performance depends on the complementary of such assets. That is, the host country can make a case
against foreign acquisition (as this would not contradict the multinationals’ optimization problem so long as there is a
local firm that qualifies for such a requirement). That said, this is not true for trade, or greenfield entry (as this would be
not optimal given the multinational’s already established production technology).
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which is greater than the local firm’s rejection profit π fl given by eq.(1) as the minimum output
requirement for foreign acquisition warrants θk ≤ (3c+2c∗−1)/4. In particular, eq.(3) suggests
that, given the rival multinational entering the host country market via independent foreign sales,
multinational k can takeover the local firm (by offering ε more than its rejection profit) and can
earn more than its profit when it competes against the other two firms by independent foreign
sales. This implies that given the rival multinational committing to independent foreign sales, each
firm has a strong incentive to deviate from the "cooperative" equilibrium. Acquisition of the local
firm, however, decreases the non-acquiring multinational’s profit from independent foreign sales
(π f1 = π
f
2 ≥ πe−k) insofar as θk ≤ (3c+2c∗−1)/4, and thus each firm has an incentive to preempt
the rival’s acquisition of the local firm.
Firm k’s "preemptive" valuation, denoted vpk , can be written as the difference between its acquisition
profit given by eq.(2) and its profit from independent foreign sales when the rival firm acquires the












which is greater than its takeover valuation as θk ≤ (3c+ 2c∗− 1)/4, where θ−k represents the
rival’s post-acquisition marginal cost. Sufficient cost synergies are warranted to trigger preemptive
acquisitions, which are also empirically supported; see Molnar (2007). The reason is that with
sufficient cost synergies, the business-stealing effect by the non-acquiring firm can be avoided,
and thus the acquisition of domestic assets becomes incentive compatible for both multinationals.
Moreover not only do sufficient efficiency gains increase the acquiring multinational’s profits, but
also the valuation of the domestic assets (as the non-acquiring multinational will be negatively
affected). By imposing a minimum output requirement for foreign acquisition, the host country
thus guarantees that any permissible foreign acquisition should qualify for such cost synergies,
increasing the multinationals’ valuation of the domestic assets and leading to competition for a
preemptive acquisition of the local firm.
Notice that, given the assumptions c ∈ (0,1) and 1−3c+2c∗ > 0 so that there is no crowding-out
effect, the ex-post efficient multinational (e.g., firm 1) will have a higher preemptive valuation than
the ex-post less efficient multinational (e.g., firm 2) such that vp1 > v
p
2 given θ1 < θ2. Assuming an
arbitrarily small probability that the ex-post less efficient multinational believes that it may still
acquire the local firm against the ex-post efficient multinational, it is clear that
Proposition 1 In equilibrium, both firms will compete for foreign takeover the outcome of which
will be a preemptive foreign acquisition by the ex-post efficient multinational at a price that is
(almost) equal to the ex-post less efficient multinational’s preemptive valuation as expressed by
eq.(4).
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where the first term is multinational k’s gross (operating) profit after having acquired the local firm,
given by eq.(2), and the expression in square-brackets is simply Ω, the acquisition price equal
to the ex-post less efficient multinational’s preemptive valuation. The following remarks are in
order. The more efficient is multinational k – the lower is θk – the higher is its gross profit from
foreign acquisition. Lower θk, however, implies a higher cost of foreign acquisition as it leads to
a higher preemptive valuation for the ex-post less efficient multinational. By the same token, a
lower ex-post marginal cost of the rival multinational implies also a higher acquisition price for
multinational k. By putting an upper bound on the ex-post marginal costs of the multinationals
competing for foreign acquisition, the minimum output requirement for foreign acquisition given
by Condition 1 thus limits the ex-post surplus that multinationals can transfer abroad. Using eq.(4),









Note that the last term in eq.(6) is multinational k’s outside profit such that it enters the host country
via independent foreign sales enabling the rival multinational to acquire the local firm at a price
(almost) equal to the local firm’s reservation (rejection) price (π fl ) given by eq.(1). Therefore the
gain from foreign acquisition of the local firm to the ex-post efficient multinational k (relative to
the case the rival multinational acquires the local firm) is vpk − v
p
−k > 0. Also, notice that limθk→θ−k
vpk − v
p
−k = 0, k = {1,2}, that is, the smaller is the difference between ex-post marginal costs, the
smaller is the gain from foreign acquisition relative to the case the rival multinational acquires the
local firm.
This leads to
Proposition 2 While each multinational has a strong incentive to deviate from a "cooperative"
equilibrium, the strategic use of a consumer welfare argument in regulating foreign market entry
(that warrants a minimum output requirement for foreign acquisition) together with "multinational
competition" may lead to a "prisoner’s dilemma" situation for the multinationals, especially when
there is fierce multinational competition for the local firm’s foreign acquisition.
Proof: The strong incentive to deviate from a "cooperative" equilibrium is already discussed,
and is clear from eq.(3). In the case that there is fierce multinational competition for the local
firm’s foreign acquisition, it can happen that only if both multinationals can credibly commit to
independent foreign sales, then both multinationals earn higher profits (π fi , i = {1,2} given by
eq.(1)) than their profits with the "acquisition" outcome given by eq.(2), that is, the difference in
profits between the "non-cooperative" (acquisition) equilibrium and the "cooperative" (independent
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for the non-acquiring (ex-post less efficient) multinational, where (i) fierce multinational com-




−k = 0, k = {1,2}; and (ii) the last term in
brackets in eq.(7) and the expression in brackets in eq.(8) are negative given θ−k ≤ (3c+2c∗−1)/4
implied by the minimum output requirement for foreign acquisition, given by Condition 1.
It is mainly the outcome that qualitatively resembles the outcome of a prisoner’s dilemma game.14
While independent foreign sales (via trade or greenfield entry) can earn both firms higher profits,
especially when there is fierce multinational competition for foreign acquisition, both multinationals
have a strong incentive to deviate from independent foreign sales, and the minimum output
requirement for foreign acquisition, given by Condition 1, leads to a preemptive acquisition of the
local firm by the ex-post efficient multinational. That is, both multinationals’ profits can be less
than the case they could credibly commit to independent sales should there be fierce competition,
and even in such a case, cross-border firm acquisition that fulfills Condition 1 will emerge as part
of a non-cooperative equilibrium.
4 Welfare implications
The analysis above has been conducted on the basis that foreign market entry is allowed, and
that there is a minimum output requirement for foreign acquisition. Depending on the welfare
implications of different foreign market entry modes, however, the host country certainly can
introduce different restrictive measures, and can even ban foreign market entry, in the first stage.
That is, Condition 1 cannot be applied without allowing for foreign market entry, and thus it
14 In particular, the model can be structured along this way. Consider, for instance, firms’ strategy space: compete for
acquisition of the local firm vs. do not compete for acquisition of the local firm. If only one firm chooses to compete,
then the outcome will be one firm acquiring the local firm at a price equal to its takeover valuation. If both firms choose
to compete, then the outcome will be a preemptive acquisition by an ex-post more efficient firm. If neither firm chooses
to compete, then they will have independent foreign sales in the host country. The outcome of all three firms merging to
monopoly is not available as this will be most likely not approved by a competition authority. Also note that the model
assumes an arbitrarily small probability that the ex-post less efficient multinational believes that it may still acquire the
local firm against the ex-post efficient multinational. Thus it is also individually rational for the ex-post less efficient
multinational to compete for foreign acquisition. It should now be clear that the non-cooperative equilibrium will be the
outcome of both firms competing for foreign acquisition of the local firm, whereas the cooperative equilibrium will be
the outcome of both firms refraining from such competition.
www.economics-ejournal.org 12
Economics: The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal 13 (2019-20)
should be considered subordinate to the host country’s foreign market entry regulation. The model
assumes that the host country allows for foreign market entry so long as total welfare, defined as
the sum of consumer welfare and the profit of the local firm, as given by eq.(9), does not decrease.







; s ∈ {m, f ,a}, (9)
where Qs is aggregate output, πsl is the local firm’s profit, and s represents the market structure
such that m is the monopoly case, f is the oligopoly case with independent foreign sales, and a
represents duopoly between the two multinationals, one of which acquires the local firm.
Let W m(c) and W f (c,c∗,c∗) denote local welfare, respectively, when there is no foreign sale in the
host country (local monopoly) and when the multinationals enter the host country by independent
foreign sales. Also denote by W fm the welfare change relative to the monopoly case when the




































which immediately leads to
Lemma 1 Compared to the monopoly case, local welfare improves with independent foreign sales
(W fm > 0) insofar as the multinationals opting for such independent foreign market entry in the
host country are sufficiently productive such that c∗ < (7c−1)/6.
As is already mentioned in Section 1, this is a standard result in the FDI literature, which does not
change with the strategic use of a consumer-welfare argument in regulating foreign market entry.
To put it differently, there is no guarantee that foreign market entry through independent foreign
sales improves welfare. That is, more restrictive foreign market entry regulations may be warranted
depending on the productivity of multinationals. Local competition increases with independent
foreign sales increasing (decreasing) aggregate sales (the market price), and thus consumer welfare
increases. The more productive the multinationals - the smaller is c∗ - the more the increase in
consumer welfare. Although the multinationals’ independent sales in the host country decrease the
local firm’s profit, consumer welfare increases by more than the decrease in the local firm’s profit,
especially when the multinationals’ marginal costs are sufficiently low.
Let W a(θk,c∗) denote local welfare when multinational firm k, having a smaller ex-post marginal
cost θk (and thus a higher preemptive valuation v
p
k given by eq.(4)), has acquired the local firm and
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the other multinational has entered the host country via independent foreign sales. Equation (11)






















where the second expression in square-brackets (in the second line) is simply the local firm’s
gain from foreign acquisition of its assets, that is, the acquisition price equal to the preemptive
valuation of the non-acquiring multinational. Section 3 has already shown that both multinationals’
preemptive valuation is greater than their takeover valuation which is greater than the local




l for any k = {1,2}; see equations (1), (3), and (4)).
Also Condition 1 warrants that aggregate output with foreign acquisition is greater than that
with independent foreign sales by multinationals, and thus consumer welfare given by the first
expression in square-brackets in eq.(11) is also greater than that given by W f in eq.(10). This leads
to
Proposition 3 When there is multinational competition for foreign acquisition, for which there
is a minimum output requirement (given by Condition 1) warranted by the strategic use of a
consumer welfare argument in regulating foreign market entry, local welfare with preemptive
foreign acquisition is greater than that with both multinationals entering the host country via
independent foreign sales.
Local competition increases in both cases relative to the monopoly case. In the case both multina-
tionals enter the host country via independent sales, two multinationals that are more productive
than the local firm enter the market and increase (decrease) the number of firms (average industry
marginal cost). By contrast, in the case of foreign acquisition, less productive local firm is replaced
by an ex-post more productive foreign firm, while the other foreign entrant is ex ante also more
productive than the local firm. Although in both cases aggregate output increases (and so does
consumer welfare), the strategic use of a consumer welfare argument in regulating foreign market
entry that warrants a minimum output requirement for foreign acquisition (given by Condition 1)
guarantees that preemptive foreign acquisition (led by Condition 1) increases consumer welfare by
more than independent foreign sales. By the same token, in both cases, some producer surplus is
transferred from the local firm to the multinationals as foreign market entry by the multinationals
decreases the local firm’s profit relative to the monopoly case.
As is already shown, relative to independent foreign sales, with preemptive foreign acquisition,
the local firm can retain more profits so long as there is multinational competition for foreign
acquisition of its assets. Lemma 1 compares local welfare with independent foreign sales relative
to the monopoly case, and shows that when the multinationals have sufficiently low marginal
costs, the increase in consumer welfare surpasses the decrease in the local firm’s profit, with which
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local welfare increases. As for the change in local welfare with foreign acquisition relative to the
monopoly case, however, comparing W a given by eq.(11) with W m given by eq.(10) shows that
Proposition 4 Multinational competition for preemptive foreign acquisition that fulfills the min-
imum output requirement, given by Condition 1, bids up the local firm’s gain to the extent that
together with the increase in consumer welfare guaranteed by Condition 1, local welfare with
foreign acquisition is always greater than that with local monopoly.
Although the local firm’s gain from foreign acquisition of its assets by the ex-post more efficient
multinational relative to the monopoly case is smaller, multinational competition for foreign
acquisition earns the local firm a significantly high acquisition price. In contrast to Koska (2019),
the strategic use of a consumer welfare argument in regulating foreign market entry, which warrants
a minimum output requirement for foreign acquisition as given by Condition 1, guarantees a level
of consumer welfare that is always sufficient to surpass the decrease in the local firm’s profit. Given
these results, the following policy implication would be immediate:
Corollary 1 Complete trade and investment liberalization together with the strategic use of a
consumer welfare argument in regulating foreign market entry and the corresponding minimum
output requirement as defined by Condition 1 will not hurt the host country insofar as there is also
multinational competition for foreign acquisition.
Similar to Norbäck and Persson (2007) and Koska (2019), it can be argued that it would not be
optimal for the host country to ban foreign acquisition and permit trade or greenfield entry. This
is also the empirically relevant case as reported by UNCTAD (2000). Additionally, the results
suggest that the host country might opt for complete liberalization and strategically use a consumer
welfare argument in regulating foreign market entry, by imposing a minimum output requirement
for foreign acquisition given by Condition 1. This holds not only for any permissible trade or
greenfield entry, but also for some cases where independent foreign sales decrease local welfare
relative to local monopoly. That is, the host country might still consider liberalizing the market
and using the consumer-surplus standard strategically so as to lead multinationals to compete for
preemptive foreign acquisition.
5 Concluding remarks
In a simple oligopolistic market entry model, this study has scrutinized the implications of
multinational competition for cross-border firm acquisition (for which there is a minimum output
requirement warranted by the strategic use of a consumer welfare argument in regulating foreign
market entry) on multinationals’ foreign market entry behavior and on local welfare. The results
have shown that when strategically using a consumer welfare argument in regulating foreign market
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entry, the host country is not hurt, but can gain substantially in terms of welfare, especially when
there is also multinational competition for foreign acquisition. In particular, this study has shown
that cross-border firm acquisition may emerge as an equilibrium foreign market entry mode even
when it is less profitable than trade or greenfield entry in the times of complete liberalization (which
is expected to be the case especially when there is fierce multinational competition for foreign
acquisition). By strategically using a consumer welfare argument in regulating foreign market
entry, and thus by allowing for foreign market entry and imposing a minimum output requirement
for foreign acquisition, the host country can lead multinationals to compete for foreign acquisition
for purely preemptive reasons. The outcome of this is not only higher consumer welfare, but also a
significantly high acquisition price improving welfare relative to the monopoly case, to trade, and
to greenfield entry.
There are different avenues by which this paper can be extended. For instance, some non-prohibitive
trade and investment costs can be included in the model. In such a case, the multinationals’ outside
options will be determined by the proximity-concentration trade-off as detailed in Section 1. All the
results will then follow. By the same token, the model has assumed a single local firm for simplicity.
It is also rather straightforward to extend the model to local competition prior to market entry of
foreign firms. The results are not sensitive to this assumption. As is already mentioned in Section 1,
in Koska (2019), there is, to some extent, local competition, although there is only one foreign firm
entering the host country. In contrast, this paper focuses on multinational competition for foreign
acquisition of a local firm. Norbäck and Persson (2008) take both types of competition on board
(and they consider an oligopolistic market structure), although they do not consider a minimum
output requirement for acquisitions, nor do they look at welfare implications. Following both
Koska (2019) and Norbäck and Persson (2008), under a minimum output requirement as detailed
in this paper, it is straightforward to show that there is always a preemptive takeover so long as
local firms are identical and foreign firms compete for acquisition of the same local firm. In such
a case, the results still will qualify, though there will be some level effect, especially on outside
profits and acquisition prices (firms’ valuations). By contrast, introducing firm heterogeneity
among local firms will complicate the model. The reason is that it is not clear whether the most
(or the least) productive local firm will always be targeted for firm acquisition: for different
constellations of parameter values different local firms may be targeted; see Pagnozzi and Rosato
(2016) for the case of complete information, and Koska et al. (2018b) for the case of incomplete
information. An interesting extension of the model, however, would be to relax the assumption of
homogeneous goods. In the context that consumers love variety, this would warrant a modification
of the consumer-welfare argument used strategically in regulating foreign market entry, and could
generate some interesting welfare results. As such an extension deserves its own model, it is left to
future research.
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